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ABSTRACT
This paper considers employment growth and unemployment from 1990-2010 in a cross-section
of cities in light of practical tools that city governments have at their disposal to provide relief. In
particular, I test educational attainment (both initial levels and growth over time) and public
capital investment as influences on job growth and changes in unemployment rates in 83 central
cities in the United States. Change in educational attainment over time is suggestive of causing
higher job growth and lower unemployment. The implication is that initiatives to attract and
retain college-educated professionals and investments in increasing college attainment among
incumbent residents have the potential to reduce joblessness and improve social welfare. Despite
some evidence that public capital outlays led to employment growth and reduced unemployment
in the 1990s, the overall association between capital outlays and labor market health is weak.
Intergovernmental spending as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA),
however, was found to have a positive effect on unemployment rates in 2009 and 2010. A
relatively weak correlation between the two dependent variables used in the analysis—
employment growth and unemployment rates—underscores the mitigating roles of migration and
labor force participation in translating job creation into employment growth for members of the
unemployed population.
JEL Classification Codes: O15, R23, J68
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Predictors of Employment Growth and Unemployment
in U.S. Central Cities, 1990–2010

This paper considers employment growth and unemployment over the past two decades
in a cross-section of cities in the context of practical tools that city governments have at their
disposal to provide their constituents—and their fiscs—with relief. While labor markets are
metropolitan phenomena—a metropolitan area is in fact defined in terms of economic integration
as measured by commuting patterns—virtually no levers of social and economic policy can be
pulled at the metropolitan level. In cities where unemployment is high and budgets are
constrained, local officials have a narrow range of alternatives. These include incentive strategies
designed to attract and retain firms and promote development projects; a newer breed of
strategies, borne of the emphasis on human capital as a growth driver, designed to attract or
produce skilled residents; and physical infrastructure investment strategies designed in the short
term to create employment demand and in the long term to produce favorable conditions for
growth in conjunction with private capital investment.
The paper begins by providing a brief overview of three types of municipal employment
growth strategy: 1) tax abatements and grants, 2) enhancements to the human capital of the local
labor supply, and 3) capital financing for public infrastructure. It then reports the results of a
series of panel regressions in which I test predictors of job growth and unemployment rates at the
municipal level between 1990 and 2010, using 83 U.S. central cities as cases. In particular, I test
educational attainment (both initial levels and growth over time) and public capital investment as
influences on job growth and changes in unemployment rates. While there are some
disadvantages to using cities (as opposed to metropolitan areas) in this analysis, these are
outweighed by the advantage of a focus on geographic units that overlap with political
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jurisdictions, and by the advantage of being able to rely on municipal-level reporting of public
infrastructure outlays. 1 The main findings are as follows:
•

There was a strong association between labor market health and growth in collegeeducated residents in cities during the 1990–2010 period. In contrast, the data contain
much less evidence of an association between cities’ initial levels of educational
attainment and positive labor market outcomes in the two decades. Strong growth in
the number of degree-holding residents led to employment growth across a decade
and low unemployment at its end; a high initial “stock” of bachelor’s degree holders
did not.

•

In Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions, high expenditures of “public capital” at
the beginning of the 1990s predicted better urban labor market conditions at the end,
but this factor was insignificant or negative in the panel regressions and in OLS
regressions for the 2000s. Some panel specifications indicate that high public capital
outlays exerted a significant negative effect on cities’ employment growth. These
ambiguous results are likely driven by significant diversity, in baseline conditions and
in motivation, among cities that spent similar amounts on public capital over the
period. Some cities’ investments sparked population and employment growth, or
enabled them to “catch up” after prior periods of expansion, while in other cities,
larger than average capital outlays were needed to shore up obsolete infrastructure in
the midst of decline. Despite some evidence that public capital outlays led to
employment growth and reduced unemployment in the 1990s, the overall association
between capital outlays and labor market health is weak.

•

Intergovernmental spending as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA) had a positive effect on unemployment rates in 2009 and 2010. This result
follows on the work of other researchers who conclude that the increase in effective
demand represented by a national-level stimulus appears to have prevented much
greater instability and unemployment in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis than
would otherwise have occurred.

•

A relatively weak correlation between the two dependent variables used in the
analysis—employment growth and unemployment rates—underscores the mitigating
roles of migration and labor force participation in translating job creation into
employment growth for members of the unemployed population. In many cities,
adding employment did not “move the needle” on the difficult problem of reducing
the unemployment rate.

Because the variables in the panel regressions are mostly endogenous, the policy
conclusions to be drawn from the research are necessarily somewhat tentative. However, the
1

For example, payroll employment (as contrasted with resident employment) is not available from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics at the city level.
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results suggest that deliberate and aggressive policies to increase the number of bachelor’s
degree holders within cities’ populations are not misplaced. There is a need for more work to
discern the efficacy of municipal policies targeted at attracting, retaining, and “home-growing”
college graduates, and to elaborate the local conditions under which such policies succeed.
Operationalizing variables associated with the interventions, and measuring outcomes as a
function of them, is challenging, but this project deserves the same kind of attention that has
been paid to the evaluation of tax incentives to firms. Initiatives to raise the level of educational
attainment among cities’ incumbent residents also deserve more comprehensive investigation.
While there is little enthusiasm at the moment in Congress or in state legislatures for
comprehensive initiatives such as universal pre-K or inexpensive public postsecondary
education, human capital development efforts that originate at higher governmental scales are
likely to be necessary if policymakers hope either to mitigate the devastating effect of long-term
unemployment on people in severely distressed municipalities or to strengthen the fiscal
positions of those places.
The finding that municipal infrastructure outlays, in contrast to gains in educational
attainment, exerted an insignificant or negative impact on employment in this cross-section of
cities during the time period examined implies that local-level infrastructure spending is not a
reliable job growth strategy for central cities. This may be attributable to the diverse
circumstances in which cities might find themselves spending more than average amounts on
infrastructure (such as in reaction to either growth or obsolescence) and to variation by place in
the quantity of infrastructure gained per dollar of public capital expended. The models show a
positive employment impact from the ARRA in the cross-section of cities, however, suggesting
that exogenous infusions of infrastructure spending going forward (such as those proposed in the
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current American Jobs Act initiative) could help cities reduce unemployment and prevent its
deleterious effects on both neighborhoods and households.

BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Employment has been slower to recover nationally since the recession that ended in June
2009 than after previous recessions; even after three years of recovery, the national
unemployment rate averaged 8 percent during 2012, considerably higher than the prerecession 5
percent. 2 Moreover, with seasonally adjusted employment at about 135 million at the end of
2012, there were still 3.3 million fewer jobs in the economy than in December 2007, the first
month of the recession (Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Statistics series). In
2012, net job gain in the economy averaged about 181,000 jobs per month, only slightly
exceeding the level of job growth needed simply to absorb new entrants into the labor force. 3
Unemployment affects America’s cities in distinct ways. Table 1, which displays
unemployment trends in the nation’s 10 largest central cities since the nation officially emerged
from recession in June 2009, shows that cities in the western and southern United States (with
the exception of California) have unemployment that, while higher than the 5 percent that
characterized the last expansion, remains below the national average. High unemployment rates
in California and parts of the East and Midwest have been stickier, and there is no evidence of
convergence. Additionally, there is no regional pattern observable in unemployment changes
since 2009. Phoenix, which had the fourth-highest unemployment rate in 2009, had the third2

When the recession began in December 2007, national unemployment was 5 percent and had been at or
below 5 percent for the previous 30 months (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012).
3
According to the Hamilton Project, an economic policy initiative at the Brookings Institution, more than
10 million more jobs than currently exist would be needed in order to regain prerecession employment levels,
accounting for new entrants into the labor force (Hamilton Project 2013).
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lowest rate in 2012, while San Antonio’s unemployment rate grew by two-tenths of a percent
over the same time period. Outside the Sunbelt there have also been large improvements
(Chicago) and large slippages (Philadelphia), while in every region there are some cities where
unemployment has remained persistently high (New York, Los Angeles) or low (Houston).

Table 1 Unemployment in Large U.S. Central Cities, 2009–2012 (%)
City

June 2009a

Percent point change:
Jun 2009–Dec 2012

December 2012

Monthly avg. 2012

2009 (Annual)

8.8

9.5

9.2

9.4

0.6

11.3

12.2

12.8

13.0

1.7

Chicago

9.7

10.0

10.9

11.7

−1.6

Houston

6.1

6.9

7.2

7.6

−0.4

10.6

10.7

9.6

9.8

0.7

Phoenix

6.9

7.5

10.6

11.0

−3.2

San Antonio

5.7

6.5

6.3

6.5

0.3

San Diego

8.1

8.9

9.6

10.0

1.9

Dallas

6.4

7.4

8.1

8.3

−0.6

San Jose

8.3

9.3

12.0

12.7

4.4

United States

8.4

8.3

9.3

9.5

−1.2

New York
Los Angeles

Philadelphia

NOTE: Figures are not seasonally adjusted. Highlighted cells indicate unemployment in excess of the national
average.
a
June 2009 was the first month of the official recovery.

Unemployment at the municipal level is the result of multiple and interacting influences. 4
Fundamentally, firms’ birth, death, expansion, and contraction—as well as their relocation—
drive net job growth, with hiring and location decisions a function of production costs and
revenues. However, a city that loses jobs may register a large or small change in its
unemployment rate, depending on migration and labor force participation trends. Similarly, a
city that gains jobs experiences a relatively small decline in its unemployment rate if the

4

See Elhorst (2003) for a comprehensive review of theoretical and empirical explanations for regional
unemployment differentials.
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additional jobs are filled by in-migrants from other regions or by noncity residents of the
metropolitan area (see Bartik [1991] and Persky et al. [2004]). Locally, specific rates of worker
discouragement and local reservation wages also exert effects on unemployment. From their
work on state growth patterns from 1950 to 1990, Blanchard and Katz (1992) conclude that
unemployment rates were sensitive to economic shocks only in the short term (5–7 years) and
that labor mobility, rather than job creation, in fact constituted the dominant adjustment
mechanism after booms or slumps. Evidence that a disconnect between employment growth and
unemployment persists in the present day can be observed by comparing Tables 1 and 2. In
several cities, high employment growth during the recent recovery seems to have done little to
reduce high rates of unemployment.

Table 2 Employment Change in Large U.S. Central Cities, 2009–2012
Employed population
Change in employed
population
City
June 2009
December 2012
(Jun 2009–Dec 2012)

Percent change in
employed population
(Jun 2009–Dec 2012)

New York

3,606,722

3,630,179

Los Angeles

1,674,997

1,688,532

13,535

0.8

Chicago

1,180,905

1,152,782

−28,123

−2.2

Houston

981,568

976,817

−4,751

−0.5

Philadelphia

592,302

586,540

−5,762

−1.0

Phoenix

705,808

678,402

−27,406

−3.9

San Antonio

597,388

588,430

−8,958

−1.5

San Diego

624,538

660,361

35,823

5.7

Dallas

541,531

547,493

5,962

1.1

San Jose

403,092

444,920

41,828

10.4

140,196,000

142,415,000

2,219,000

1.6

United States

23,457

0.7

Just as many social and economic vectors contribute to fluctuations in local
unemployment rates, many consequences ensue from these fluctuations that transcend their
impact on near-term welfare at the household level. Labor market shocks have been decisively
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shown to exert effects on individuals’ lifetime earnings profiles. 5 Over a longer time horizon,
prolonged periods of high unemployment have a hysteresis effect for places as well as for
individual workers, atrophying human capital stocks and placing strain on the social
infrastructure of neighborhoods and communities (Bartik 2001; Martin 2011). Moreover,
unemployment has fiscal effects as municipalities collect less revenue in times of joblessness.
Cities’ fiscal and employment positions are mutually reinforcing; inevitably, lack of revenue for
municipal services in turn hampers cities’ abilities to generate conditions conducive to private
employment growth. The relationship is particularly strong when a tax on wages or income
comprises a proportion of the revenue dedicated to municipal government, but user fees, sales
tax revenue, and property tax collection also suffer when unemployment is high. This link
between economic health and local fiscal capacity is surely one factor explaining Blanchard and
Katz’s (1992) finding that at the state level between 1950 and 1990, employment shocks
typically had permanent effects on growth.
The recession and recovery of the late 2000s have been unique not only for the slow
recovery of the job market during the recovery period but also for having occurred against a
backdrop of increased devolution of fiscal burdens from federal to state and from state to local
governments (see Krane, Ebdon, and Bartle [2004] and Tannenwald [1998]). Faced with
declining revenues, local governments have shed workers and deferred capital spending at rates
that distinguish this recovery from past ones, exacerbating already severe private sector job loss. 6
5

Hysteresis effects of displacement and long-term unemployment for individual workers, particularly for
those displaced during recessions, are well-documented (see Davis and von Wachter [2011]). Long-term
unemployment (unemployment lasting at least six months) has reached an unprecedented high during this recession
(see Burtless [2012]).
6
On a seasonally adjusted basis, the public sector shed 721,000 jobs between June 2009 and January 2013,
92 percent of which were in state and local governments. The employment effects of foregone or deferred capital
spending amplify this figure, since most of the job creation impacts of public capital investment occur in the private
sector.
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A signal feature of the ARRA, enacted in February 2009, was its provision of direct transfers to
state and local governments in order to mitigate these effects. Roughly one-third of the stimulus
dollars (which totaled approximately $821 billion in all) were authorized to compensate for tax
losses (through the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund) and to offset the fiscal impact of increased
demand for services such as Medicaid (Chodorow-Reich et al. forthcoming; Conley and Dupor
2012). ARRA spending also reached individuals directly through tax relief. However, ARRA
funds allocated to federal Departments of Transportation and Energy and the Environmental
Protection Agency were a more conventional fiscal stimulus in that they financed direct federal
spending on capital infrastructure. 7 Studies evaluating the impact of the federal stimulus
package, particularly its transportation component, reignited a long-dormant discussion about the
impact of public capital on economic growth.
Despite the limited set of tools available to municipal governments to induce growth in
employment, local officials, often joined by real estate interests and coalitions of prominent
place-bound enterprises and institutions, devote considerable effort to this task (Logan, Whaley,
and Crowder 1997; Giloth 2004; Peterson 1981). Growth strategies pursued at the municipal
level may be conceived in terms of three “policy levers.”
Tax Expenditures and Grants
The most common local government response to the imperative to grow employment is
to offer tax incentives to firms and development projects based on the premise that tax costs are a
critical determinant of establishment location. The logic of tax expenditures is that in allowing
the private sector actors to retain and invest a larger proportion of revenues or profits, the danger

7

As of early 2013, approximately $90 billion had been paid out in the Transportation, Infrastructure, and
Energy/Environment categories (see www.recovery.gov).
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of crowding private investment with public expenditure is diminished. State and local
governments use tax abatements, land write-downs, low-cost financing, and outright grants to
compete against one another for private investment, spending an estimated $50 billion per year
in the process (Peters and Fisher 2004).
There is a substantial literature evaluating the employment impact of targeted tax
expenditures intended to attract and/or retain businesses within municipal or state jurisdictions. 8
Some researchers find that incentives make a positive impact on employment growth at the
establishment level (Greenstone and Moretti 2003; Loh 1993), especially if targeted at firms in
industries that have been the object of long-term economic development planning activities such
as state-funded research centers and workforce development initiatives (Lester, Lowe, and
Freyer 2012). But a majority of scholarship on incentives questions both their efficiency and
their net impact on local resident employment and social welfare (Bartik 2007; Brindisi and
Ehrenberg 2008; Kolko and Neumark 2009; Persky, Felsenstein, and Carlson 2004; Peters and
Fisher 2002). Many studies suggest that incentives are not often effective at inducing jobs, and
when they do, the fiscal costs (“cost-per-induced-job”) tend to be quite high. 9 When conditions
are attached to development incentives through agreements, in an attempt to ensure that job
growth occurs or that local residents are hired, these are often not enforced or carried through.
Studies tracking subsidy agreements in New York City, for example, have estimated that
subsidized projects and enterprises meet or exceed stated job creation and retention goals less
than 50 percent of the time (ALIGN 2011). The policy implications of findings such as these are
8

This is a major reason why I do not directly test tax expenditures in this analysis.
Only induced jobs—jobs that would not have been created but for the presence or offer of an incentive—
should rightly be counted as outcomes of an incentive policy. Firms and their location consultants often “game” the
process by encouraging potential locations to outbid one another (thus creating rents for the firm at the expense of
the host locality). They may also, having chosen a locality, seek abatements and grants from economic development
officials there as though the prechosen site were still in competition with other locations.
9
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contested, with some researchers urging a legislated moratorium on incentives (Fischer 2007;
LeRoy 2007) while others advocate reforms. 10 Many researchers have concluded that the optimal
policy is to eschew economic development “deals” and maintain a transparent, rational, and
easy-to-navigate tax environment across the board, and one in which firms’ tax expenditures are
repaid with high-quality services. However, the fierce competition for mobile capital among
localities is a classic prisoner’s dilemma. Local officials eager to demonstrate that their specific
actions have led to economic growth also tend to favor high-profile subsidized projects.
Enhancements to Local Labor Supply
Research linking economic prosperity and resilience to educational attainment at the
urban and metropolitan scale has recently turned officials toward policies to produce a local
labor supply possessing high levels of skill and entrepreneurship (Glaeser and Saiz 2003; Glaeser
and Shapiro 2001; Gottlieb and Fogarty 2003; Simon and Nardinelli 2002). The evident success
of “skilled, entrepreneurial areas that thrive by producing new ideas” (Glaeser, Ponzetto, and
Tobio 2011) has prompted economic development agencies to track the proportion of residents
holding bachelor’s degrees as a key indicator of adaptation to a “knowledge economy” and to
adopt measures geared toward influencing the in-migration or retention of college-educated
residents (CEOs for Cities 2012; Moretti 2012). 11 In cities with universities, these efforts may
focus on encouraging the commercialization of academic discoveries and the localization of the
resulting spin-off firms, or on efforts to induce students graduating from local colleges and
universities to remain after graduation (see Cortwright [2005] and Hansen, Ban, and Huggins
10

Suggested reforms range from aggressively enforced clawback provisions to selective use of incentives
in times of high unemployment (when their welfare effect is greater), to the linkage of incentives to hiring behavior
and/or wage standards (Bartik 2007, 2010; Schweke 2007).
11
Glaeser’s work generally suggests that the primary mechanism linking education to income and
population growth is increased productivity and entrepreneurship.
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[2003]). Other strategic measures center on amenities designed to attract and retain high-skilled
workers with the propensity to start businesses and/or to contribute to the local economic base
through consumption behavior. Amenities seen as crucial to the attraction of a creative,
entrepreneurial resident base include high-quality public spaces, specialty retail, infrastructure
for bicycling and walking, and affordable housing and workspace for artists and artisans (Florida
2002; Markusen 2004).
The human capital profile in a city may also improve via investment in the educational
attainment of its incumbent population. Several cities have launched initiatives to increase
graduation rates by focusing on degree attainment among “hometowners” who started but did not
complete college (New York City Comptroller’s Office 2012; Perna and Wolf-Powers 2012).
Efforts are also afoot to build better career pathways for youth transitioning from secondary
school to the postsecondary training (whether college or occupational certification) that is now
seen as essential for economic success in the United States (Carnevale, Smith, and Strohl 2013).
Early childhood education investments have been asserted to yield the highest return on
government investment (Bartik 2011; Carneiro and Heckman 2003), and K–12 education is also
in need of strategies that increase occupational preparation through contextualized learning
(Ferguson 2013; O’Connor 2012). However, interventions at these levels hold little appeal for
elected officials attempting to alleviate unemployment and generate revenue in the near term. As
a result, human capital attraction policies (together with efforts, in some cases, to increase degree
attainment among incumbent residents), tend to carry the day among local governments intent on
increasing education levels. Despite the growing adoption of these strategies, research evaluating
the effect of human capital attraction or development programs on urban employment or

11

unemployment rates is virtually nonexistent. This is in contrast to the large literature on the
efficacy of firm-targeted incentives.
Public Capital Investment
A third local growth strategy revolves around public sector capital expenditure.
The type of capital financing most commonly associated with contemporary local economic
development policy consists in outlays that, either backed by the city government or making use
of its tax-privileged status, go into private projects. Sometimes referred to as “public debt for
private purposes,” these expenditures encompass industrial development bonds, the proceeds of
bonds issued by tax increment financing districts or projects, and debt issued by redevelopment
authorities and quasi-public development corporations, which borrow to undertake commercespecific (sometimes firm-specific) infrastructure projects. Cities increasingly offer firms these
types of capital financing options when extending the incentive packages discussed above.
However, aside from debt issued expressly for economic development “deals,” the public goods
character of basic transportation, sanitation, and water and utilities infrastructure continues to
form the basis of a municipality’s capacity to support private employment growth. This study
investigates the proposition that infrastructure-related municipal capital outlays have an impact
on employment and unemployment outcomes. 12
Scholarship on what might be termed the growth effects of public capital investment first
emerged in the late 1980s. These studies conceived of two mechanisms by which growth effects
might operate: public infrastructure might augment the productivity of private capital, or it might
12

One original goal of this research was to determine whether cities that issued substantial public debt for
private purposes (also known as conduit debt) experienced faster job growth and lower unemployment than cities
that did this less aggressively. Unfortunately, as discussed earlier, data on this type of debt are extremely difficult to
compile. The current research therefore tests the impact of general city-level public infrastructure expenditures on
job growth and unemployment rates. The impact of public debt for private purposes, isolated from general
infrastructure expenditure, is a subject for future research.
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reduce firms’ factor costs (Eberts 1990). In either case, public capital outlays would affect firm
output at particular locations, and through that medium influence a variety of local growth
measures. Research in the 1980s and early 1990s found positive impacts of public capital on
productivity, output, and regional income (Aschauer 1989a,b; Carlino and Voith 1992; DuffyDeno and Eberts 1989; Eberts and Fogarty 1987; Munnell 1990), though not without
qualifications. 13 In a study notable for using employment growth as a dependent variable,
Munnell (1990) uses a firm location model to relate private nonagricultural employment growth
in the 50 states to explanatory variables that represented production costs (labor, land, and
energy), as well as factors affecting revenues (market density and the tax environment). Public
capital was introduced to determine whether it had an independent effect on employment .
Munnell’s results show a positive and significant contribution of public infrastructure to
employment growth. Later, in a time series model testing determinants of household, rather than
firm location, Glaeser, Sheinkman, and Shleifer (1995) also find lagged public debt levels to be
positively associated with subsequent growth in population and employment; however, they
inferred from this not that capital expenditure had induced growth but rather that rapid economic
growth had presented cities with both infrastructure needs and the fiscal means to undertake
investment.
A second wave of research on public capital advanced methodological criticisms of early
research on the link between public capital and growth, noting (like Glaeser, Sheinkman, and
Shleifer [1995]) a potential for reverse causality and arguing that data containing stochastic
trends should not be estimated using a static production function approach (Evans and Karras
13

Eberts (1986) points out, for example, that the impact of public infrastructure on growth appears to be
smaller if financed through local taxation (as opposed to federal grants) and smaller if a given city or metropolitan
area already has a large amount of public capital stock relative to private capital or if it is a lagging region with a
weak basis on which to build. A later study by Eberts (1990) finds no evidence of an impact on new firm formation.
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1994; Gramlich, 1994; Tatom 1991). The contribution of public capital to output, productivity,
and job growth was cast into doubt, and discussion of it disappeared from the literature.
However, the debate remained unsettled. Pereira (2001) used a dynamic multivariate approach to
correct for misspecification and found that transportation and other core infrastructure public
investment “crowds in” private investment in the sense that public capital may complement
private capital in the production and distribution of private output. More recently, as noted
above, research estimating the impact of the ARRA stimulus has shed new attention on the
potential contributions of public capital, particularly spending on transportation, to growth
(Feyrer and Sacerdote 2011; Leduc and Wilson 2012a,b; Wilson forthcoming). Feyrer and
Sacerdote disaggregate the impacts of different types of ARRA spending and find a strong effect
for infrastructure spending, with an implied employment multiplier of 1.85 However, the
potential of debt-financed infrastructure spending to stimulate local job growth is unquestionably
more straightforward in the case of intergovernmental spending than in the case of infrastructure
spending self-financed by municipalities. Even when interest costs are low, municipal borrowing
to finance capital investment may have a negative growth effect that overwhelms the impact of
its job creation and productivity-enhancing impacts. Research finding a relationship between
public capital and growth has generally been focused on state or federal-level capital
investment. 14

14

An exception to this is Lobo and Rantisi (1999), who find that growth in levels of investment in public
capital (as measured by total capital outlays, total long-term debt, and transportation expenditures) predicts
productivity growth over time at the level of the metropolitan region.
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The data for this study come from a cross-sectional time-series of observations
constructed for 83 U.S. primary cities. There are two time periods, the first beginning in 1990
and ending in 2000 and the second beginning in 2000 and ending in 2010. In constructing the
data set, I began with the 100 most populous U.S. central cities in 2010. As data collection
proceeded, I first removed three cities that were difficult to compare across the time period due
to city/county consolidations. 15 Subsequently, a decision was made (again for comparability
purposes) to include only primary cities in metropolitan divisions, ensuring that the data set
would include cities that were truly central to their metropolitan areas, representing the earliest
settled portions of these regions and, frequently, those in the greatest fiscal distress and with the
highest unemployment rates. Finally, Washington, D.C., and New Orleans, Louisiana, were
removed from the data set because they are unusual cases in which (for different reasons)
employment gain and/or loss during the two decades in question was assumed to be unrelated to
the independent variables of interest.
In 2010, resident employment in the cities in the data set ranged from around 78,000
(Oxnard, California) to almost 3.6 million (New York City). The cities trailed the nation in
population and employment growth over the 20-year period examined, posting 9.1 percent
employment growth against 17 percent nationally. Unemployment rates in the group of 83
central cities also exceeded national rates in 1990, 2000, and 2010; the annual unemployment
rate for 2010 was 10.4 percent for the cross section of cities as opposed to 9.6 percent for the
nation. The mean poverty rate in the cities was 17.9 percent in 1990 and had increased to 21.5
percent in 2010, consistently exceeding national rates by 5–6 percentage points. Mean bachelor’s
15

Nashville, Tennessee; Augusta, Georgia; and Louisville, Kentucky.
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degree attainment rates in the cities, however, tracked or slightly exceeded those for the general
population: 22.4 percent versus 21.3 percent in 1990, 26 percent versus 25.6 percent in 2000, and
29.7 percent versus 29.9 percent in 2010. Growth in bachelor’s degree attainment was relatively
evenly distributed over the two decades, with the mean proportion of adults over 25 with
bachelor’s degrees growing 3.7 percentage points in the 1990s and 3.6 percentage points in the
2000s (Appendix A).
Across the panel, then, the cities in the data set got more populous and “smarter,” but also
(despite a short-lived decline in poverty in the 1990s) poorer. It is notable that between 2000 and
2010, average real earnings per household decreased by 3 percent. As a group, cities in the panel
have suffered higher rates of unemployment than the nation as a whole. With respect to
educational attainment, the cities have consistently been “competitive” with the nation, with a
roughly equivalent concentration of college-educated residents on average. But mean values
mask considerable variation. For example, only 12 percent of Detroit’s residents over 25 had a
college degree in 2010, compared with 56 percent in Seattle. Poverty rates ranged from 5.9
percent (1990) and 7.5 percent (2010) in Virginia Beach to 37.3 percent (1990) and 37.6 percent
(2010) in Laredo and Detroit, respectively. New York City gained 482,429 employed residents in
the period covered by the panel, while Chicago lost 94,437. There are also regional differences:
median job growth in cities in the West census region averaged an increase in employment of
nearly 38,000 in the period 1990–2000. In contrast, the median Northeastern city lost 9,652 jobs
during that period.
The model applied to this data specifies city-level changes in employment and
unemployment as functions of decisions on the part of firm principals to found, locate, or expand
establishments in those cities. It follows the work of Munnell (1990), which assesses the effect of
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public capital on employment growth, controlling for other factors influencing profitability at
alternative locations. Munnell’s independent variables capture both cost and revenue components
of profitability; her results suggest that job growth is sensitive to labor cost and productivity, the
level of market demand, the tax burden, and the availability of inexpensive land. She finds both
educational attainment and public capital to be significant predictors of employment growth.
Because they relate to two of the policy levers discussed above, educational attainment and
public sector capital outlays are the independent variables of greatest interest in this model.
The Model
Specification 1: Employment growth between time t and t + 10
The first specification estimates the effects of predictor variables on growth in resident
employment in the cities. The dependent variable (LBEMPCHGPC) is the log of the average
change in total nonfarm employment per capita over a 10-year period. As described above,
employment is conceived as a function of firms’ location and hiring decisions contingent on the
independent variables in the model. The variable is derived from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’
Local Area Unemployment Statistics series and represents resident employment.
The basic specification of the model to be estimated is
D log(E)t10 – t0 = β + β(Wit0) + β(Tit0) + β(BAit0) + β(PCit0) + β(Pit) + β(Ait0) + e ,
where E is employment, W is wages, T is taxes, BA is skilled labor availability, PC is public
capital, P is population density, A is an exogenous, unexpected infusion of federal funds, and e is
the error term. Subscripts for time at 0 years and 10 years (t0, t10) and city (i) are included to
capture the time-series and cross-sectional nature of the data.
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The basic model also includes fixed effects for each city and for each year. The inclusion
of city fixed effects controls for changes in employment attributable to innate differences among
cities—differences, for example, due to path-dependent characteristics and to quantifiable but
time-invariant distinctions such as temperature, region, and, to an extent, industry mix. The
inclusion of a year dummy controls for changes in employment attributable to cyclical trends
correlated with time. This control is particularly important given the fluctuations in the business
cycle and the macroeconomic shocks that affected cities in the United States during the years in
question. Interpretation of the coefficients on year dummy variables included in the fixed effects
model reveals trends common to all cities in the database that are specific to the decades 1990–
2000 (which ended at a business cycle peak) and 2000–2010 (which ended in the aftermath of a
recession). The paper also discusses the results of OLS regressions for each decade.

Specification 2: Unemployment; change in unemployment rate between time t + 6 and time t+10
The second specification uses the same predictor variables but regresses them on
measures of unemployment and unemployment change. The first unemployment variable,
BUET5A, represents the average of a city’s annual unemployment rates during the last five years
of the decade (i.e., from time t + 6 to time t + 10). The second unemployment variable,
BUETCHG—the change in the unemployment rate across the five-year period ending each
panel—is a resilience measure. In the 1990s, it measures the response of unemployment to a
ramp-up in the business cycle, and in the 2000s it measures the labor market’s resilience to the
negative shock represented by the bursting of the housing bubble. Did a city’s unemployment
rate go down in a national boom period, or was it sticky? Was it comparatively stable in
recession or did it spike? This measure is possible because the country was coming out of
recession and gaining jobs in the last decades of the 1990s, while the reverse was true in the last
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several years of the 2000s. In each case a lower value on the “change in unemployment rate”
variable is an indicator of greater labor market health, in the same way that lower unemployment
is considered positive. 16 For example, if the sign on the coefficient of the independent variable
for, say, population density is positive in one of these models, this indicates that higher
population density is associated with lower unemployment (BUET5A) or a lower level of
volatility/higher level of resiliency (BUETCHG).
Like the first specification, the basic model includes fixed effects for each city and for
each year. With this specification, I also show the results of a random effects model as warranted
by the results of Hausman tests, where the fixed effects model was not preferred at a 1 percent
level of significance when compared with the random effects model, based on orthogonality.
Educational Attainment
Higher levels of educational attainment in the primary cities and their regions were
predicted to exert positive effects on employment growth and unemployment rates during the 20year period examined. As noted in the first section of the paper, a large body of research links
educational attainment to urban and metropolitan prosperity, generally measuring educational
attainment as the proportion of adults over 25 years old with at least a bachelor’s degree. It is
well documented that as many more jobs than in the past require college credentials, individuals
without college degrees have substantially lower earnings than their college-educated
counterparts (see Goldin and Katz 2008) and are less likely to be employed (Bureau of Labor
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Imagine a city where the unemployment rate dropped from 7 percent to 5 percent in the late 1990s. (t+
10) minus (t + 6) would be 2 – the smaller the value, the greater gain in employment in the course of the expansion.
Similarly, as the unemployment rate increased in the late 2000s, cities with smaller differences between their middecade unemployment rates and their 2010 unemployment rates were better off.
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Statistics 2012). 17 Accordingly, cities with low concentrations of residents holding bachelor’s
degrees—Detroit, Memphis, El Paso, Philadelphia—have some of the highest poverty rates in
the nation, and are in chronic fiscal distress. Cities with high concentrations of bachelor’s degree
holders are asserted to incubate innovation and entrepreneurship and, relatedly, to be resilient to
economic shocks (Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Tobio 2012; Gyourko 2005).
Two measures of educational attainment were used: the proportion of residents over 25
with a bachelor’s degree at the beginning of the decade (EDUT0), and the percentage point
change in the number of bachelor’s degree holders over the course of the decade (BACHCHG).
The educational attainment variables were obtained from the decennial census (for 1990 and
2010) and from American Community Survey one-year 2010 estimates (See Appendix B).
Public Capital Investment
There was a predicted positive relationship between city-level capital investment,
employment growth, and low unemployment rates. Two theories support this hypothesis. First,
as noted above, public capital expenditure, especially in periods of labor underutilization,
stimulates the economy. Per Feyrer and Sacerdote’s (2011) estimates, infrastructure spending
under the ARRA created 900,000 jobs (Feyrer and Sacerdote 2011), albeit under exceptional
economic circumstances. Second, in enhancing productivity and lowering production costs,
public capital investments increase firms’ propensity to locate operations in an area and increase
incumbent firms’ propensity to expand. It was theorized that the job growth and resident
employment effects of city-level capital investments would be discernible in the form of
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In 2011, the unemployment rate among high school graduates was 9.4 percent, compared with 8.7
percent among those with some college but no degree, 6.8 percent among associate’s degree holders, and 4.3 percent
among those with at least a bachelor’s degree.
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systematically higher employment rates (and lower unemployment) in cities that had spent
relatively more on such investments.
There are several reasons, however, to question the expectation that municipal-level
capital outlays would have this effect. First, in order to engage in capital investment, local
governments must levy taxes. For cities bearing large debt burdens, the cost of capital is greater,
intensifying the growth-suppressing effect of indebtedness. Second, cities may use capital to
replace obsolete infrastructure, with public capital exerting only a small marginal effect on
productivity as money is spent simply to get roads and sewer systems to baseline. In other words,
in distressed cities, capital spending may be helping cities to “tread water” as opposed to
growing (see Eberts and Fogarty [1987]). Third, it is probable that the unit of productivityenhancing infrastructure per dollar of public capital expended varies from place to place,
possibly vitiating a systematic link between capital outlays and growth. Finally, an observed
relationship between public capital investment and employment growth might indicate a reversecausality phenomenon under which cities with high employment growth rates are more apt to
finance new infrastructure (Glaeser, Schenkman, and Schleifer 1995; Rodriguez 2010).
The data used to estimate the public capital variables are drawn from the Individual
Finance Files of the Census of Local Government Finances. This survey is conducted
quincentenially as part of the Census of Governments in years ending in 2 and 7. 18 The survey
requires that cities report capital outlays both in the aggregate and in detail by functional area,
defining a capital outlay as “direct expenditure for contract or force account construction of
buildings, roads, and other improvements, and purchase of equipment, land, and existing
structures, and for payments on capital leases.” Repairs are classified as operating expenditures.
18

The Census Bureau uses a sample of governments to generate estimates in the intervening years.
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Because variables used in this analysis represent 4-year averages of capital outlays on the part of
each city at the start of each 10-year period, I make use of the 1990–1993 editions and the 2000–
2003 editions of the files.
Several public capital variables were constructed, all of them representing per capita
values averaged over the first four years of the panel. The most comprehensive is
LCAPOUT4YRPC_R, a broad per capita measure of capital outlays for education, hospitals, air
and ground transportation, parks and recreation, housing and community development, police,
fire and correction, solid waste management, utilities, and general government administration
(see U.S. Census Bureau [2012]). I disaggregated the components of this encompassing variable
to produce per capita measures of outlays in relevant subcategories: transportation, sanitation and
sewerage, and housing and community development, and then combined these three into a more
precise “infrastructure outlays” variable (LAGGCAPOUTPCR). Since the vast majority of
outlays were identified as being associated with construction, a decision was made not to
separate construction outlays from outlays for equipment. A variable representing debt
outstanding per capita at the start of the period (LDEBTOS4PC_R), also based on a 4-year
average), was created as well (Appendix B). All monetary figures used were expressed in 2010
dollars.
A final public capital category of interest could not be investigated in this paper.
Reported separately in the Census of State and Local Government Finances from capital outlays
for construction and equipment is “public debt for private purposes.” This classification was first
introduced into the Census of Governments in 1988 through a consolidation of several
accounting categories. Public debt for private purposes is issued by a public sector agency, such
as an industrial development authority, but its proceeds go directly to private for-profit or not-
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for-profit entities for capital projects. These entities are then entitled to the lower interest rates
associated with the federal tax exemption for municipal debt. This mechanism (also known as
conduit debt) is often used by local governments in efforts to extend incentives to firms and
property developers. It is also deployed in support of private, not-for-profit entities that such as
healthcare centers and arts organizations. Technically, however, it is not publicly held in that it is
backed by the private organizations whose activities are being financed. 19 Since the Census
Bureau began to track its issuance, public debt for private purposes has represented one of the
largest categories of local government debt. 20 Its contribution to economic development
outcomes is of great interest. However, institutional discrepancies problematize the comparison
of cities on this variable. While some cities issue debt that fits this description through so-called
dependent agencies (and report it through the Census of Governments), others do so through
special purpose governments such as economic development authorities, which independently
report to the Census Bureau. Further, one major form of debt-financed local development, tax
increment financing (TIF), is not considered by the census to involve public debt for private
purposes; while a city may report TIF borrowing on its Consolidated Annual Financial Report, it
does not report this to the Census of State and Local Government Finances. Thus, the amount
recorded in the “public debt for private purposes” category on the census form is inadequate to
describe many cities in terms of debt issued for economic development within their jurisdictions,
and inadequate to compare cities to one another. The lack of comparable census information in
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This type of debt is nonetheless often backed with tax revenues projected to be generated by an
economic development project. An example would be a stadium or master-planned commercial development that
would ordinarily be subject to property taxes, but for which a local government has decided to issue a tax abatement.
Payments in lieu of taxes or (in the case of tax increment financing districts) incremental property taxes go directly
into an escrow fund on which the private entity draws in servicing the debt.
20
Regulatory changes have also begun requiring cities to identify conduit debt more explicitly in their
Consolidated Annual Financial Reports.
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years prior to 1988 poses another barrier. The impact of public debt for private purposes, isolated
from general infrastructure expenditure, is a rich subject for future research.
Control Variables
Following Munnell (1992), control variables used in the model are factors influencing
firm costs and revenues at alternative locations. Changes in the dependent variables are related in
most cases to Time 0 levels of the predictor variables, operationalizing the theory that conditions
prevailing at the start of a 10-year period influence employment growth and unemployment as
measured at the end of that period. Predictors measured at Time 0 include wages per employee
(LAWAGET0_R); a 4-year average of the local tax burden per employee (LTXPEREMP4_R);
and population density (LPOPDENST0), which proxies for land cost and also for market size
and agglomeration effects. 21 A final control variable in the model captures the exogenous,
unexpected infusions of federal funds received through the ARRA in 2009 and 2010. Values on
the ARRA variable for each city are taken directly from Wilson’s forthcoming paper estimating
employment multipliers from ARRA spending. As assigned to the cases in the database, the
figures represent the per capita stimulus funding announced, as of February 2010, for the state in
which each city is located. 22 Full descriptions of the control variables appear in Appendix C. 23
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Variables with names starting with L have been logged for scaling to a normal distribution.
In Table 2 of his forthcoming paper, “Fiscal Spending Jobs Multipliers: Evidence from the 2009
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act,” Wilson lists, by state, per capita amounts of non–Department of Labor
stimulus spending announced from August 2009 through February 2010. While these state per capita figures are an
imperfect proxy for city-level recovery dollars received (and while they could never be used to directly estimate the
impact of the stimulus itself on the cities), they serve as a satisfactory instrument of comparison among cities for the
purposes of constructing a control variable. Because the ARRA was enacted in 2009, the value for the ARRA
variable for all cities in the 1990s panel is zero.
23
Because a number of central cities annexed land during the period under examination, a variable
(SQMDELT) was initially included, indicating the extent to which the city’s area had increased in square miles, to
ensure that observed employment growth was not simply an artifact of a city’s territorial expansion. This variable
was removed from the model after it consistently showed no significant effect on the dependent variables and did
not improve goodness of fit.
22
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Educational Attainment
In 1990, bachelor’s degree attainment among people over age 25 in the cross-section of
cities ranged from 8.1 percent in Cleveland, Ohio, to 42 percent in Madison, Wisconsin, with a
mean of 22.4 percent. The mean grew to 26 percent in 2000 and to 29.7 percent in 2010, at
which time Seattle boasted a rate of 56 percent and Detroit was in the lowest position at 12
percent. The average city increased its attainment level by 7.3 percentage points over the two
decades, with all of the cities posting an increase.
Given the emphasis conventionally placed on human capital as a determinant of place
prosperity, it was expected that both initial levels of educational attainment and high rates of
growth in working-age residents with bachelor’s degrees would be predictive of employment
growth and low unemployment rates. The results are somewhat surprising: evidence of growth in
educated population may be suggestive of causing positive outcomes (low unemployment and
employment growth), but initial educational attainment—that is, the proportion of bachelor’s
degree holders at the beginning of the decade—does not.
Growth in College-Educated Population
Table 3 presents results from two versions of a fixed effects model using the log of
employment growth per capita as the dependent variable (LBEMPCHGPC). In the first version
(3A), the educational attainment variable used is initial endowment of education (EDUT0), or
the proportion of residents over 25 with bachelor’s degrees. In the second version (3B), the
educational attainment variable is the percentage point change, from time T0 to time T10, in the
number of residents 25 and older with bachelor’s degrees (BACHCHG). The results indicate, as
expected, that controlling for local factors, cities that added bachelor’s degree holders at high
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rates between 1990 and 2010 experienced greater employment growth per capita than their peers
(3B). Specifically, a one-percentage-point change in the number of individuals with bachelor’s
degrees in a city’s population is associated with an 11.1 percent increase in employment per
capita. This effect is quite large, but it makes sense in the context of the fact that fast-growing
cities such as Raleigh, Austin, Denver, Seattle, and Portland experienced significant growth in
well-educated residents during the period covered in the panel. It suggests that growth in skilled
labor supply is an important determinant of labor market health, providing support for the
hypothesis that a kind of virtuous circle of growth is at work in “skilled cities,” whereby highly
educated residents simultaneously respond to labor demand through in-migration and create new
labor demand through consumption and entrepreneurship (see Shapiro 2006).

Table 3 Dependent Variable: Employment Change Per Capita, Logged
3A

3B

Proportion of residents with BA degree, Time T=0

−0.0043

N/A

% change in residents with BA degree T=0 to T=10

N/A

0.1119***

−0.3246***

−0.2808***

0.0018

0.0164

−0.1753***

−0.1282***

4-year average of infrastructure outlays per capita (L)

−0.0095

−0.0119**

Per capita ARRA funding for state where city is located

0.000005

0.000005

Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Year Dummy

Yes

Yes

Robust S.E.

Yes

Yes

0.0000

0.0000

Wages per employee, Time T=0 (L)

a

4-year average of local tax burden per employee (L)
Persons per square mile T=0 (L)

Prob > F

NOTE: ** significant at the 95% confidence level; *** significant at the 99% confidence level.
a
(L) denotes that variable is logged.
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Table 4 presents results from fixed and random effects models using the unemployment
variable (BUET5A) as the dependent. 24 Here, under both specifications, change in educational
attainment also suggests the expected, using fixed effects, a one-percentage-point change in the
number of bachelor’s degree holders over the decade may be suggestive of causing an almost
two-point reduction in the five-year unemployment rate at the end of the decade (4C). Under a
random effects specification, the effect of an increase in educational attainment on
unemployment is even stronger (4D). 25

Table 4 Dependent Variable: 5-Year Average Unemployment Rate, t=6 through t=10
BUET5A
4A

4B

4C

4D

Proportion of residents with BA degree, Time T=0

0.3100**

−0.1738***

N/A

N/A

% change in residents with BA degree T=0 to T=10

N/A

N/A

−1.8263**

−1.8841***

−7.534**

2.0768*

−2.7069

−2.5082

4-year average of local tax burden per employee (L)

1.5318

0.2544

1.3419

0.1002

Persons per square mile T=0 (L)

4.0751*

0.7147***

2.3699

1.0326***

4-year average of infrastructure outlays per capita (L)

0.1829

−0.1059

0.2207

−0.1578

−0.0022***

−0.0017*

−0.0021***

−0.002*

Fixed effects

Yes

No

Yes

No

Year dummy

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Robust S.E.

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.0000

N/A

0.0000

N/A

N/A

0.0000

N/A

0.0000

Wages per employee, Time T=0 (L)

a

Per capita ARRA funding for state where city is located

Prob > F
Prob > chi2

NOTE: * significant at the 90% confidence level; ** significant at the 95% confidence level; *** significant at the 99%
confidence level.
a
(L) denotes that variable is logged.
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Results of Hausman specification tests suggested that with respect to the dependent variable for
unemployment, random effects models conform as well or nearly as well to the data as fixed effects models.
25
A negative value on an education variable in a model where unemployment is acting as the dependent
variable indicates that either a higher initial concentration of bachelor’s degree holders (EDUTO) or a larger rate of
rate of change in the number of bachelor’s degree holders (BACHCHG) is associated with lower unemployment.
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The cities in the upper right-hand quadrant of Table 5—cities ranked highly on both
growth in bachelor’s degree holders and on the unemployment metric—instantiate the virtuous
circle noted above. The cities in the lower right-hand quadrant, by comparison, might be seen as
being trapped in an opposite cumulating pattern. The cities that ranked highly on growth in
bachelor’s degree holders and lowly on the unemployment metric instantiate the virtuous circle
noted above. By comparison, the cities that ranked lowly on growth in bachelor’s degree holders
and highly on the unemployment metric might be seen as being trapped in an opposite
cumulating pattern. In these cities, stagnation both in in-migration of college graduates and in the
attainment of college credentials by members of the incumbent population is preventing the

Table 5 Growth in Bachelor’s Degree Holders and Unemployment
High growth in bachelor’s degree holders, High
unemployment

High growth in bachelor’s degree holders, Low
unemployment

Laredo, TX (1, 65)
Las Vegas, NV (2, 56)
Miami, FL (15, 76)
Bakersfield, CA (16, 71)
Atlanta, GA (20, 58)

Charlotte, NC (5, 16)
Boise, ID (6,10)
Austin, TX (9,7)
Raleigh, NC (13,6)
Durham, NC (14,3)
Colorado Springs, CO (17,26)
San Antonio, TX (19,19)

Decline (or slow growth) in bachelor’s degree holders,
low unemployment

Decline (or slow growth) in bachelor’s degree holders,
high unemployment

Tulsa, OK (77, 14)
Des Moines, IA (73, 11)
Baton Rouge, LA (72,28)
Pittsburgh, PA (71, 33)
Little Rock, AK (70,17)

Detroit, MI (83, 83)
Buffalo, NY (81, 68)
Rochester, NY (79,61)
Toledo, OH (76,66)
Milwaukee, WI (69, 60)
Cleveland, OH (68,75)
Baltimore, MD (67,69)
Philadelphia, PA (63,63)
Riverside, CA (60,72)
Fresno, CA (57,81)

Growth in bachelor’s degree holders = High rank indicates high percentage change in number of residents over
25 with a bachelor’s degree or higher, 1990–2010
Unemployment = High rank indicates low average annual unemployment rates 1990–2000 and 2006–2010
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creation of new, high-skilled employment even as the lack of such employment discourages inmigration. Slow or negative employment growth constrains demand for goods and services and
leads to even higher rates of unemployment among less-skilled, less-mobile residents.
Initial College-Educated Population
While change in educational attainment—a large proportional increase in the number of
adults with bachelor’s degrees—consistently predicts both employment growth and low
unemployment rates, the impact of initial educational attainment—namely the proportion of
residents over age 25 with a bachelor’s degree at time T = 0—is much more ambiguous. There is
no significant association between initial educational attainment and employment growth in
these models (Table 3, column 3A; see also Figure 1. With respect to unemployment rates,
random effects models (Tables 4B and D) suggest that joblessness is positively affected both by
initial education endowments (stocks) and by changes in attainment (flows), but the fixed effects
models (Table 4, columns 4A and 4C) indicate a positive effect for flows and a negative effect
for stocks. These are puzzling results. 26 A linear and positive relationship between initial
attainment and growth has been observed in other studies (Glaeser, Sheinkman, and Schleifer
1995; Munnell 1990), and the observation of such a relationship would conform to the logic that
human capital stocks represent assets that yield benefits over time, as highly educated people
enable existing firms to choose from large pools of talent, or, in some cases, start and grow new
businesses themselves.

26

The initial educational attainment variable performs somewhat more expectedly in Ordinary Least
Squares regression by decade (see Table 9), but again, only reliably where unemployment (rather than employment
growth) is the dependent variable.
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Figure 1 Education at Time 0 (EDUT0) and log of employment change per capita t = 0 through t = 10
(LBEMPCHGPC).

There are several explanations for the finding that initial education levels (at the start of
the decade) are not good predictors of high employment growth and low unemployment. First,
because college degree holders typically already number among the ranks of the employed in a
given labor market, boosting employment growth may require more than posting a high value on
the “stock” variable. In other words, if new jobs require high levels of education, they do not
represent opportunities for those in the labor market who are most likely to be unemployed or out
of the labor force. Rather, these are opportunities for individuals with bachelor’s degrees—a
population whose members are more likely to have jobs already. In this situation, an inflow of
educated migrants filling newly created jobs may be needed in order for cities to see increases in
employed population. Only as new earnings stimulate marketwide demand would demand for
less-educated workers expand, leading to decreases in unemployment.
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This explanation is supported by the appearance of many of the same cities—Austin,
Charlotte, Raleigh, Durham, and Boise—in the top right quadrants of Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8. In
these initially “skilled” cities, increases in bachelor’s degree holders were accompanied both by
high employment growth and by relatively low unemployment. Other patterns observable in
these tables, , however, cast some doubt on the proposition that a confluence of high initial
attainment and a high rate of growth in bachelor’s degree holders is a prerequisite for labor
market health. Two initially highly educated cities with modest growth in college graduates
(Madison, Wisconsin, and Lincoln, Nebraska) experienced both employment growth and low
unemployment rates. San Francisco, Boston, Minneapolis, and Little Rock maintained low
unemployment rates despite lackluster employment growth. Finally, a few initially educated
cities with high rates of growth in bachelor’s degree holders (San Jose, Atlanta) experienced both
low employment growth and high unemployment rates during the 1990–2010 period.
A second explanation for the absence of an association between initial educational
attainment and employment growth rests on the argument that labor market dynamics during this
period were frequently driven by factors other than market demand for college graduates. These
include housing market expansion, job creation in the wake of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), and, most notably, territorial annexation. All of the cities in which high
employment growth coincides with low initial educational attainment grew in land area during
the period under study, from 5 percent growth in Fresno to nearly 200 percent in Laredo (see
Table 6, lower right quadrant). Although I attempt to control for this using a population density
variable, territorial growth clearly mediates the expected relationship between dependent and
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independent variables. 27 In addition to the simple phenomenon of annexation, employment
growth in a number of cities—particularly those where the effects of the housing bubble were
most pronounced—is driven by industries in which college-educated workers were in relatively
low demand, such as construction, retail, and transportation,. In NAFTA-affected cities, the
establishment of manufacturing branch plants is an additional factor.

Table 6 Initial Education and Employment Growth per Capita, 1990–2010
High initial educational attainment, Low employment
High initial educational attainment, High employment
growth
growth
San Francisco, CA (5, 47)
Minneapolis, MN (8,54)
Little Rock, AK (8,60)
Lexington-Fayette, KY (7, 67)
Baton Rouge, LA (17, 63)
Oakland, CA (20,48)
Atlanta, GA (23, 66)

Madison, WI (1,20)
Raleigh, NC (2,4)
Durham, NC (4,9)
Austin, TX (6,3)
Lincoln, NB (14, 15)
Charlotte, NC (15,8)
Boise, ID (18,7)
Colorado Springs, CO (19,10)

Low initial educational attainment, Low employment
growth

Low initial educational attainment, High employment
growth

Cleveland, OH (83, 76)
Newark, NJ (82,73)
Detroit, MI (81,75)
Toledo, OH (76, 77)
Milwaukee, WI (75,74)
Akron, OH (74,69)
Philadelphia, PA (72,71)
Baltimore, MD (70, 79)

Laredo, TX (80,6)
Las Vegas, NV (77,w)
Fort Wayne, IN (69,19)
San Antonio, TX (61,14)

Initial educational attainment = high rank indicates high proportion of residents with Bachelor’s degrees or higher
in 1990
Employment growth = high rank indicates high rate of growth in employment per capita, 1990-2010

Relevant to this argument is an August 2012 Brookings Institution study that uses realtime data on vacant positions and their skill requirements to calculate, for the 100 largest U.S.
metropolitan areas, an education gap index estimating the shortage of educated workers in each
region relative to demand for those workers (Rothwell 2012). The study holds that variations in
27

As a result of annexation, in fact, Laredo and Las Vegas were not only quite low-ranked with respect to
initial attainment but also held the two highest ranks for increase in bachelor’s degree holders.

32

Table 7 Growth in Bachelor’s Degree Holders and Employment Growth per Capita, 1990–2010
High growth in bachelor’s degree holders, Low
employment growth

High growth in bachelor’s degree holders, High
employment growth

Indianapolis, IN (3,53)
Tampa, FL (7,51)
Miami FL (15,55)
Atlanta, GA (20,66)
San Jose, CA (22,52)
Chicago, IL (26,68)

Laredo, TX (1,6)
Las Vegas, NV (2,2)
Fayetteville, NC (4,1)
Charlotte, NC (5,7)
Boise, ID (6,7)
Reno, NV (8, 11)
Austin, TX (9,5)
Portland, OR (11, 17)
Orlando, FL (12, 13)
Raleigh, NC (13,4)
Durham, NC (14,9)
Bakersfield, CA (16,5)
Colorado Springs, CO (17,10)
Ft. Worth, TX (18,12)
San Antonio, TX (19, 14)

Decline (or slow growth) in bachelor’s degree holders,
low employment growth

Decline (or slow growth) in bachelor’s degree holders,
high employment growth

Detroit, MI (83,75)
Birmingham, AL (82,83)
Buffalo, NY (81,80)
Toledo, OH (80,77)
Rochester, NY (79,78)
Cincinnati, OH (78,81)
Tulsa, OK (77,70)
Des Moines, IA (73,61)
Baton Rouge, LA (72,63)
Mobile, AL (71, 62)
Little Rock, AK (70,600

Riverside, CA (60,18)
Lubbock, TX (58,26)
Fresno, CA (57,22)
Corpus Christi, TX (53,23)

Education change = High rank indicates high percent change in number of residents with a bachelor’s degree or
higher, T = 0 through T + 20
Employment growth = High rank indicates high rate of growth in employment per capita, 1990–2010

this gap explains about two-thirds of the variance in unemployment rate levels in the 100 largest
metros between 2006 and 2010. However, regions vary widely in the level of education required
by posted job openings; thus, it is not high educational attainment per se but high attainment
relative to demand for college-educated employees that matters.
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In explaining the ambiguous effects of educational attainment on labor market health in
these models, one must also point to the absence of an expected alignment between employment
growth and unemployment. Although it was also observed in Tables 1 and 2, this finding is
counterintuitive. Employment growth and the unemployment rate on the local level are
obviously related; at a given moment, a city’s labor force consists of its employed residents plus
its unemployed residents, with the unemployment rate expressed as 1 − (employment/labor
force). One would expect, for example, that since growth in educational attainment is suggestive
of causing employment growth, it should also be suggestive of causing low unemployment.
Interestingly, however, the employment change per capita variable (LBEMPCHGPC) and the
average unemployment variable (BUET5A) have a Pearson correlation coefficient of just 0.42.
The relationship is a moderate one, signaling the mitigating roles of migration and labor force
participation dynamics in translating job creation into employment growth for members of the
unemployed population. 28
While many low-growth cities in the data set consistently experience high unemployment
(such as Newark, Cleveland, Buffalo, and Baltimore), there are also low-growth/lowunemployment cities where a steady state of sorts appears to preside. For example, Minneapolis,
which ranks 54th of 83 cities in employment growth across the 20-year period, has maintained an
unemployment rate that is low enough to be in the top quintile in the data set for both the 1990s
and the 2000s. A number of cities in the panel also experienced a confluence of rapid
employment growth and high unemployment rates. Some of these were low-initial-attainment

28

Bartik (1991) shows that, on average, 80 percent of new jobs created in a metropolitan area go to inmigrants rather than incumbent residents. Recently, large discrepancies in some cities between measured growth in
payroll employment and the growth in resident employment have led to speculation that payroll employment gains
are being offset by an increase in the size of the labor force, prompted by the reentry of formerly discouraged
workers into the labor market (see New York City Independent Budget Office [2013]).
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cities with employment growth based on housing appreciation and/or territorial annexation
during the 1990s and early 2000s. 29 Others, such as New York City, Los Angeles, and San Jose,
are large cities in which the persistence of high unemployment amid growth in resident
employment is likely attributable to high rates of in-migration.

Table 8 Initial Education and Unemployment
High initial education, High unemployment

High initial education, Low unemployment

Oakland, CA (20,77)
Atlanta, GA (23,58)
Portland, OR (25,50)

Madison, WI (1,2)
Durham, NC (4,3)
Raleigh, NC (2,6)
Austin, TX (6,7)
Boise, ID (7,9)
Minneapolis. MN (8, 13)
Little Rock, AK (8, 17)
Boston, MA (10,21)
Lincoln, NE (14,1)
Albuquerque, NM (15, 15)
Charlotte, NC (15,16)

Low initial education, low unemployment
Des Moines, IA (57,11)
San Antonio, TX (61,19)
Jacksonville, FL (60,32)
Fort Wayne, IN (69,40)

Low initial education, high unemployment
Cleveland (83,75)
Newark, NJ (82,80)
Detroit, MI (81,83)
Miami, FL (79,76)
Oxnard, CA (78,78)
Toledo, OH (76,66)
Milwaukee, WI (75, 60)
Stockton, CA (73,82)
Philadelphia, PA (72,63)
St. Louis, MO (71,70)
Baltimore, MD (70,69)

Initial educational attainment = High rank indicates high proportion of residents with bachelor’s degrees or higher
in 1990
Unemployment = High rank indicates low average annual unemployment rates 1996 to 2000 and T 2006-2010

Public Capital Investment
Total capital outlays at the city level (indicated by variable LCAPOUT4YRPC_R),
smoothed over four years for calculation purposes, averaged $292 per capita during the 1990–
29

At the end of the 2000s, in spite of two decades of employment growth, the collapse of overheated
housing markets in Laredo, Las Vegas, and a number of central California cities induced extremely high
unemployment rates in these places.
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1993 period (in real 2010 dollars), ranging from $62 per capita in Stockton, California, to $2,254
per capita in Orlando, Florida. Average capital outlays increased faster than the pace of inflation
between the first and second periods (using 1992 and 2002 as benchmarks), averaging $421 per
capita in 2000–2003, from $121 in Miami to $1,919 in San Francisco. Although most cities saw
real increases in their capital outlays per capita between 1990 and 2010, just over one-fifth of the
sample (18 cities) saw real decreases on capital outlays spending per capita over the period
covered by the panel. Spending on transportation, sewerage, and housing and community
development infrastructure (a subset of total outlays designated with the variable
LAGGCAPOUTPCR) averaged $226 per capita in 1990 and $229 per capita in 2000. Average
debt outstanding among the cities averaged $2,106 per capita in 1990, increasing markedly to
$3,054 per capita in 2000.
In Tables 9 and 10, the impact of infrastructure outlays is reported alongside the results
for the educational attainment and control variables. The independent variable used
encompasses combined outlays for transportation, sewerage, and housing and community
development (LAGGCAPOUTPCR); this is a more precise measure of infrastructure spending
than the variable for all capital outlays. In Table 3, column A (with employment growth per
capita as the dependent variable) the capital outlays variable is insignificant. In column B, where
the “attainment growth” rather than the initial attainment variable is used, there is a small
negative effect, specifically, a 0.01 percent decline in employment growth with every 1 percent
increase in capital outlays. Across Table 4, which uses unemployment as the dependent variable,
the capital outlays measure is insignificant. In Table 9, the dependent variable is a “resiliency”
measure that (as noted above) proxies for the stability of a city’s employment rate in the face of
macroeconomic changes. Here in three of the four specifications, the sign on the public capital
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Table 9 Dependent Variable: Resiliency
BUETCHG
9A

9B

9C

9D

Proportion of residents with BA degree, Time T=0

−0.4043

−0.03895**

N/A

N/A

% change in residents with BA degree T=0 to T=10

N/A

N/A

1.6450

0.9041

−1.5479

1.474

−8.7872**

0.3187

−0.9072

−0.00058

−0.7618

−0.1116

1.836

−0.3335*

3.2072

−0.2479

0.6368*

0.3214*

0.6030*

0.2697

−0.005***

−0.0049***

−0.0060***

−0.0048***

Fixed effects

Yes

No

Yes

No

Year dummy

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Robust S.E.

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.0000

N/A

0.0000

N/A

NA

0.0000

N/A

0.0000

Wages per employee, Time T=0 (L)

a

4-year average of local tax burden per employee (L)
Persons per square mile T=0 (L)
4-year average of infrastructure outlays per capita (L)
Per capita ARRA funding for state where city is located

Prob > F
Prob > chi2

NOTE: * significant at the 90% confidence level; ** significant at the 95% confidence level; *** significant at the
99% confidence level. Five-year unemployment rate change, calculated as t=10 minus t=6. Columns 9A and 9C
are fixed effects regressions; columns 9B and 9D are random effects regressions. Negative coefficient indicates
greater resiliency in association with the independent variable.
a
(L) denotes that variable is logged.

variable is significant (at 90 percent) and positive, suggesting that cities with higher
infrastructure outlays were less resilient; in these places, unemployment rates were likely to
decrease during the expansion of the late 1990s and more likely to increase during the recession
of the late 2000s. In summary, the data suggest that higher infrastructure outlays exert either no
influence or a negative influence on labor market outcomes. Substitution of other measures of
capital expenditure (the generalized LCAPOUT4YRPC_R and disaggregated measures for
individual categories of expenditure) yields similar results, as does the use of debt outstanding
per capita rather than capital outlays.
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Table 10 Ordinary Least Squares Results
A. Employment growth per capita (LBEMPCHGPC) B. Unemployment (BUET5A)
10A
1990

10B
2000

10C
1990

10D
2000

Proportion of residents with BA degree, Time T=0

0.0024**

0.0003

N/A

N/A

% change in residents with BA degree T=0 to T=10

N/A

N/A

0.1644***

0.1819***

N/A

−0.0333

0.0077

−0.0054

0.0147

−0.0385**

Wages per employee, Time T=0 (L)

a

4-year average of local tax burden per employee (L)

−0.0662*** −0.0362**

10E
1990

10F
2000

10G
1990

10H
2000

N/A

N/A

N/A

−1.7814*

−1.436

−0.1423

0.3247

−3.706*

−5.328***

−0.0222*

0.4704

0.9674**

0.3792

0.9721**

−0.1862*** −0.1535***

−0.0079

−0.0096

−0.02

−0.0105

1.001**

0.2542

1.242**

0.3943

0.02025**

0.0021

0.011**

−0.0062

−0.492**

0.2444

−0.6518*

0.33**

Per capita ARRA funding for state where city is located

N/A

−0.0000009

N/A

0.0000004

N/A

−0.003***

N/A

−0.0037**

City is in Northeast Census region

0.013

0.0462**

0.0194

0.0164

0.2237

−0.9633

0.1229

−0.4877

0.0551***

0.0403***

0.0477***

0.0173

1.858***

1.071*

2.03***

1.916***

City is in Southern Census region

0.009

0.0405**

0.0131

0.177

1.305***

−0.5455

0.989*

−0.331

R-Squared

0.48

0.25

0.7

0.47

0.60

0.6

0.37

0.41

Persons per square mile T=0 (L)
4-year average of infrastructure outlays per capita (L)

City is in West Census region
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NOTE: * significant at the 90% confidence level; ** significant at the 95% confidence level; *** significant at the 99% confidence level. Year dummies were
omitted from all Ordinary Least Squares equations due to collinearity.
a
(L) denotes that variable is logged.

When I investigate the data in separate time periods, placing them within OLS models for
1990–2000 and 2000–2010, a different picture emerges. For example, as seen in Table 10,
columns 10A and 10C, a 1 percent increase in capital expenditures at the start of the 1990s is
suggestive of a 0.01–0.02 percent increase in employment by the end of the decade. Similarly, as
seen in columns 10E and 10G, a 1 percent increase in capital expenditures at the start of the
1990s is suggestive of a 0.0049 to 0.0066 point reduction in the average unemployment rate in
the decade’s last five years. These results indicate that, controlling for other factors, cities with
high infrastructure expenditure experienced both lower unemployment and higher employment
growth than their peers during the 1990s. 30
Despite evidence of an association between capital outlays and labor market health in the
1990s, it is important to observe that high-capital expenditure cities—and their low-spending
counterparts—are a diverse group (Table 11). New York City and San Francisco had substantial
outlays that coincided with and supported healthy if not spectacular population and job growth
during the period. Richmond, Atlanta, and Minneapolis, however, represent exceptions to the
proposition that public capital expenditure leads to high growth. High capital investments in
these cities in the 1990s likely fell into the above-mentioned category of bringing obsolete or
inadequate infrastructure to baseline. Finally, half of the cities in the top tier grew rapidly in the
1990s (as well as prior) because of population influx, territorial expansion, or both (Fayetteville,
Orlando, San Antonio, Anchorage, Denver). These cities likely invested in infrastructure as

30

In both the panel and the OLS models, generalized versions of the capital outlays variable and measures
of outlays in individual categories (transportation; sanitation and sewerage) differed very little from the
“infrastructure” variable in terms of their observed impact on the dependents. Moreover, results for the variable
representing outstanding debt per capita (LDEBTOS4PC_R) tracked the results for capital outlays.
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much in response to burgeoning growth as to spark it. 31 Thus, while these results demonstrate
some association between larger-than-average municipal capital outlays and positive labor
market outcomes in the 1990s, the direction of causality in the relationship between one and the
other remains unclear. 32
Table 11 Cities with the Highest and Lowest Capital Outlays Per Capita (1990–1993 average)
Annual unemployment Employment growth,
City, State
Amount per capita
Rank
rate, 1990
1990–2000 (%)
Orlando, FL

2,254

1

6

20

Denver, CO

1,801

2

5.6

24

Fayetteville, NC

1,113

3

5

54

New York, NY

1,003

4

6.9

11

San Francisco, CA

835

5

3.8

16

Minneapolis, MN

788

6

4.3

10

Anchorage, AK

745

7

5.1

15

San Antonio, TX

718

8

8

27

Richmond, VA

700

9

5.7

−5

Atlanta, GA

682

10

7.2

9

Oxnard, CA

177

74

8.3

10

Madison, WI

169

75

2.1

16

Laredo, TX

167

76

11.9

37

Pittsburgh, PA

160

77

4.5

−5

Modesto, CA

155

78

10.6

15

Omaha, NE

154

79

2.9

21

Newark, NJ

142

80

10.7

−13

Bakersfield, CA

130

81

8

43

Fort Wayne, IN

79

82

6

19

Stockton, CA

62

83

11.7

18

⁞

31

Arguably the consequences of failing to provide both basic infrastructure and amenities to the collegeeducated migrants to these places could have slowed or arrested growth.
32
The group of cities that spent the least on capital outlays during the 1990s (Table 10) includes three
distinct types as well: 1) slow-growing but stable cities (Pittsburgh, Omaha, Madison); 2) rapidly growing cities that
annexed areas where infrastructure already existed or where new public goods were paid for by tax increment
financing or impact fees (the central California cities); and 3) poor cities in which officials did not have the
wherewithal to invest in public capital stock (Newark, Laredo).
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In the OLS equations for the 2000s, public capital expenditure at the municipal level has
no observable effect on either employment growth or unemployment. Likely explanations
include the fact that debt service burdens increasingly haunted municipal borrowing activity in
this decade, and the fact that the housing market crash in 2007 fiscally overwhelmed many cities
through direct and indirect losses of revenue. Especially where recent growth had been driven
by housing expansion, public officials who had invested in infrastructure at the start of the 2000s
in anticipation of continued growth found themselves both indebted and, with the collapse of the
housing market, facing significant operating budget deficits.
That municipal-level public capital would not register an impact in this anomalous
decade—or in the fixed effects models covering the entire panel—is expected. However, the
infusion of intergovernmental funds represented by the ARRA does show an impact. In Table 4,
the results of both fixed effects models indicate a small but positive impact of stimulus funding
on unemployment rates. Each $500 per capita of ARRA funding in a city’s home state is
associated with a city unemployment rate that is lower by approximately one percentage point. 33
Further, the ARRA variable is consistently significant in Table 9, which reports the results of
models in which the “resiliency” measure serves as a dependent variable. While municipal-level
public capital expenditures, then, are relatively unreliable as predictors of labor market health,
Tables 4 and 10 offer evidence that incrementally greater federal fiscal stimulus funding
promoted both lower unemployment and (even in high-unemployment cities) smaller increases
in the unemployment rate during the recent recession and its aftermath.

33

As described above, rather than estimate ARRA spending by city, this paper uses an estimate of
spending at the state level as calculated by Wilson (forthcoming). In constructing the variable, each city was
assigned a value equivalent to the non–Department of Labor spending per capita announced in that city’s state
between August 2009 and February 2010.
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Other Predictors
Population Density
Higher density cities in the panel were consistently less likely to experience either
employment growth or low unemployment. For example, in Table 4, the models indicate that a
density increase of 1 percent predicts an unemployment rate that is one-tenth to four-tenths of a
percentage point higher than in otherwise comparable cities. While theory suggests that dense
places—in providing large, concentrated markets for goods and services and concentrated pools
of labor and suppliers—are a driver of prosperity, empirical evidence has long highlighted the
contemporary growth disadvantages experienced by high-density cities, which tend to be older,
poorer, and more congested, with higher development costs for vacant property (see Glaeser and
Shapiro [2001]). 34
Wages and taxes
The real value of household wages is associated with lower job growth and higher
unemployment in some cases (Table 3, column A and B, and Table 4, column B), but with
positive outcomes in others (Table 4, column A, and Table 9, column C). Taxes are significantly
associated with negative labor market outcomes in the OLS specifications but not in the panels.
In a traditional industrial location framework, firms would be expected to gravitate toward cities
where labor is less costly and taxes lower, but these results serve as a confirmation that
employment rose during this period in many “high-skilled” cities where high labor costs and
high taxes were likely not a major discouragement to firms (see Tables 6 and 7). Though wage
and tax costs undoubtedly continue to affect firms’ location decisions on the margin, the
34

As explained in Note 22, population at time t= 0, combined with a measure of change in land area to
capture annexation, was tried as an independent variable in place of the density figure. However, the joint
significance of this second model was weaker, indicating that population density was the superior variable. High
population and high population density are highly correlated (0.678), such that the density variable captures
population size to some extent.
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ambiguous impact of wages and taxes on labor market health in these models highlights the
limits of a purely factor cost–oriented firm location model in a knowledge-based economy.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This paper empirically tests several theories and assumptions about the causes of
employment growth and unemployment in U.S. central cities over the past two decades. This is
an important exercise because while labor markets are regional in nature, central cities remain
politically autonomous—some might say isolated—within metropolitan areas. Over the past 20
years, there has been a marked shift in much of the literature from cities to metropolitan regions
as units of analysis. While this shift usefully highlights increases in economic distress in the
suburbs as well as the urban core, it also clouds the lens through which policy is contemplated.
This is due to the fact that policy action at the metropolitan scale is possible, largely only in
concept (see Goetz, Chapple, and Lukerman 2003; Hollenbeck and Hewat 2010; Niedt and Weir
2010; Wolf-Powers 2012).
Because efforts to improve employment and other economic development outcomes at a
metropolitan regional level have encountered barriers, there remains an ongoing need for insight
into what municipal officials in distressed cities can do to address unemployment. Economic
development incentive packages, which typically combine local and state tax expenditures, have
been extensively studied. But other tools with significant local geographic components have
received less attention. In testing the impact of human capital and public capital, respectively, on
local employment and unemployment trends between 1990 and 2010, this paper sheds light on
additional practical tools that city governments have at their disposal.
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Because of the endogeneity of many of the variables in the model, the policy conclusions
to be drawn from this research are tentative. Nevertheless, the results constitute a starting point
for policy discussion and for further research, especially on individual policies and programs
designed to attract educated workers to cities. My results suggest, echoing the work of other
scholars, that growth in educational attainment is a major factor driving the health of urban labor
markets. They also indicate that high rates of growth in educational attainment (human capital
“flows”) are a more reliable contributor to growth than initial levels of educational attainment in
the population (“stocks”). In the aggregate, cities in which the number of bachelor’s degree
holders grew had higher employment growth and lower unemployment rates across this time
period than did their peers. 35
The implication is that policymakers’ deliberate and aggressive policies to increase the
number of bachelor’s degree holders within their cities’ populations are not misplaced. Initiatives
to harness the capabilities and resources of academic institutions, efforts to create amenity-rich
neighborhoods that attract and retain college-educated professionals, and investments in
increasing college attainment among incumbent residents all have the potential to reduce
joblessness in places where unemployment rates remain in the double digits nearly four years
after the official end of the recession. (The findings also suggest a need for more work to discern
the efficacy of policies targeted at attracting, retaining, and “home-growing” college graduates.)
Operationalizing variables associated with such interventions, and measuring outcomes as a
function of them, is challenging, but this project deserves the same kind of attention that has
been paid to the evaluation of tax incentives to firms. Neighborhood-based investments in the
amenities such as parks and greenways, street trees, and restored historic sites could increase
35

It is also obvious from close scrutiny of the results that housing price appreciation is not a sustainable
foundation on which to build a skill-rich economy (see Panel A in Table 5).
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cities’ capacity to draw skilled labor. Researchers need to determine which among these policies
work best and to elaborate the conditions for their successful implementation. 36
Public capital is a potential additional lever, but one that should be viewed more
cautiously. In the 1990s, variations in municipal capital outlays for infrastructure appear to
explain some portion of the variation in city-level employment outcomes, with higher
infrastructure outlays associated with higher employment growth and lower unemployment
(though causality potentially operates in either direction). This result is not sustained in the OLS
models for the 2000s. Moreover, in models holding city fixed effects constant, local-level
infrastructure investment appears to be associated with adverse labor market outcomes: low
employment growth and high unemployment. This suggests that the phenomenon identified by
Eberts and Fogarty (1987) may prevail in this data set: a dynamic in which incremental local
public capital investments in cities already possessing a high ratio of public to private capital do
little to induce growth. As noted above, in some cities, capital spending may have helped cities
simply to bring older infrastructure to baseline. It is also possible that the data are registering
conditions in cities that grew quickly in the 1990s and early 2000s and increased capital
spending in anticipation of future growth, only to be hard hit by the collapse of the housing
market in 2007 and 2008.

36

The use of limited city-level fiscal capacity to improve conditions primarily in the affluent or gentrifying
neighborhoods of poor cities is nevertheless controversial, and there is reason to be skeptical about their likely
success in many of the cities that appear in Panel B in Table 5. These are high-poverty cities subject to cumulative
employment losses that will be difficult to arrest with incremental local human capital-based interventions, even
those centered on human capital attraction. Initiatives to raise the level of educational attainment among
nonmigrants deserve more comprehensive investigation. There appears to be little appetite at the moment in
Congress or in state legislatures for comprehensive initiatives such as universal pre-K or inexpensive public
postsecondary education. Nevertheless, human capital development efforts that originate at higher governmental
scales are likely to be necessary if policymakers hope either to mitigate the devastating effect of long-term
unemployment on people in severely distressed municipalities or to strengthen the fiscal positions of those places.
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The impact of exogenous government investment is much less ambiguous: higher per
capita amounts of ARRA funding in 2009 and 2010 are associated with lower unemployment
and greater resiliency in the 83 central cities examined. This result follows on the work of other
researchers who conclude that the increase in effective demand represented by the national-level
stimulus appears to have prevented much greater instability and unemployment over the past
four years than would otherwise have occurred. It suggests that federal infusions of infrastructure
spending going forward—such as those proposed in the current American Jobs Act initiative—
could help cities to reduce unemployment and its long-term consequences for individuals,
households, and places. There is increasing evidence that state and local austerity have inhibited
job growth even as private sector employment begins to recover (see Bivens and Sheirholz 2012,
Looney and Greenstone 2012).
Markets continue to be the chief driver of the spatial distribution of economic opportunity
in the United States, and in this context it is useful to bear in mind that household migration
choices—more so than government policies—will continue to bear the major burden of
adjustment to changes in city and regional growth paths. This paper, however, offers insights
into the prospects of strategies that government might pursue to improve outcomes in cities
where slow job growth, high unemployment rates, and fiscal crisis hamper well-being long after
the official end of the 2007–2009 economic recession.
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Appendix A: Summary Statistics on 83 Primary Cities
Mean (Range)
Variable

Average change (%)

1990

2010

1990–2010

2000–2010

555,724
(75,695 – 7,322,564)

644,111
(193,524 – 8,175,133)

15.9

5.5

Population density
(persons per square mile)

4,301
(133.3 – 23,705.3)

4,604
(171.9 – 26,954.0)

7.0

−1.1

Total nonfarm employment

261,578
(30,399 – 3,105,799)

285,377
(78,285 – 3,588,288)

9.1

1.4

6.2
(2.1 – 15.3)

10.4
(4.1 – 23.1)

67.7
(point change: 4.2)

126.1
(point change: 5.8)

22.4
(8.1 – 42)

29.7
(12 – 56)

32.6
(point change: 7.3)

14.2
(point change: 3.6)

454
(62 – 2,254)

587
(33 – 2,322)

29.3

15.1

Four-year average public debt outstanding per capita ($)

3,273
(0.339 – 11.027)

4,223
(0.322 – 16.054)

29.0

14.1

Average earnings per household ($)

55,827
(42,666 – 83,438)

61,822
(39,139 – 106,198)

10.7

−3.0

1,633
(0.470 – 8.264)

2,220
(0.930 – 10.128)

35.9

20.3

n/a

n/a

3.7

4.7

17.9
(5.9 – 37.3)

21.5
(7.5 – 37.6)

20.1
(point change: 3.6)

24.2
(point change: 3.9)

Population

Annualized unemployment rate (%)
Bachelor’s degree attainment rate (%)
(residents over 18 with BA or higher)
Four-year average public capital outlays per capita ($)
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Average taxes collected per employee ($)a
Index of average annual change in housing prices
Poverty rate (%)
NOTE: All monetary figures reported in 2010 $.
a
Average over four year-period beginning in Year T0.
SOURCE: Population, land area, Bachelor’s degree attainment, average earnings per household, and poverty rate data for 1990 and 2000 from U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial
Census. Total nonfarm employment by residence and annualized unemployment rate data from the Bureau of labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics program. Fouryear averages for public capital outlays, debt outstanding, and total taxes from the U.S. Census Bureau, Census of State and Local Government, editions 1990–2010. Index of
average annual change in housing prices from the Federal Housing Finance Agency, City/MSA HPI Data.

Appendix B: Independent Variables of Interest
Variable name

Definition

Source/calculation

Percent of population, age 25 and over, that have received at
least a Bachelor’s degree

BACHCHG

Percent change in the number of individuals 18 and older who U.S. Census Bureau, 1990 and 2000 Decennial Census. 2010
have received a Bachelor’s degree at time t=10, where t=0 is the one-year American Community Survey. Measure calculated by
baseline.
dividing the change in the number of individuals who have
received a Bachelor’s degree at time T+10 from the number of
individuals who held Bachelor’s degrees at time T=0.

LCAPOUT4YRPC_R

Average annual total capital outlay spending at time T=0, T+1,
T+2, and T+3, per capita, logged. In 2010 constant dollars.

U.S. Census Bureau. Census of State and Local Government,
editions 1990–1993 and 2000–2003. Measure calculated by
summing four year total capital outlays spending and dividing
by summed population over the same period, then dividing the
resulting figure by four to calculated annual average. Resulting
figures adjusted for inflation.

LTDEBTOS4PC_R

Average annual total debt outstanding at time T=0, T+1, T+2,
and T+3, per capita, logged. In 2010 constant dollars.

U.S. Census Bureau. Census of State and Local Government,
editions 1990–1993 and 2000–2003. Measure calculated by
summing four year total debt outstanding and dividing by
summed population over the same period, then dividing the
resulting figure by four to calculated annual average. Resulting
figures adjusted for inflation.

LTRCAPOUT4YRPC_R

Average annual transportation capital outlay spending at time
T=0, T+1, T+2, and T+3, per capita, logged. In 2010 constant
dollars.

U.S. Census Bureau. Census of State and Local Government,
editions 1990–1993 and 2000–2003. Measure calculated by
summing four year transportation capital outlays spending and
dividing by summed population over the same period, then
dividing the resulting figure by four to calculated annual
average. Resulting figures adjusted for inflation.

LSCAPOUT4YRPC_R

Average annual sewerage capital outlay spending at time T=0,
T+1, T+2, and T+3, per capita, logged. In 2010 constant
dollars.

U.S. Census Bureau. Census of State and Local Government,
editions 1990–1993 and 2000–2003. Measure calculated by
summing four year sewerage capital outlays spending and
dividing by summed population over the same period, then
dividing the resulting figure by four to calculated annual
average. Resulting figures adjusted for inflation.
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EDUT0

U.S. Census Bureau, 1990 and 2000 Decennial Census. 2010
one-year American Community Survey

Appendix B (Continued)
Variable name

Definition

Source/calculation
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LHCCAPOUT4YRPC_R

Average annual housing and community development capital
outlay spending at time T=0, T+1, T+2, and T+3, per capita,
logged. In 2010 constant dollars.

U.S. Census Bureau. Census of State and Local Government,
editions 1990–1993 and 2000–2003. Measure calculated by
summing four year housing and community development capital
outlays spending and dividing by summed population over the
same period, then dividing the resulting figure by four to
calculated annual average. Resulting figures adjusted for
inflation.

LAGGCAPOUTPCR

Average annual transportation, housing and community
development, and sewerage combined capital outlay spending at
time T=0, T+1, T+2, and T+3, per capita, logged. In 2010
constant dollars.

U.S. Census Bureau. Census of State and Local Government,
editions 1990–1993 and 2000–2003. Measure calculated by
summing four year transportation, housing and community
development, and sewerage capital outlays spending and
dividing by summed population over the same period, then
dividing the resulting figure by four to calculated annual
average. Resulting figures adjusted for inflation.

ARRA

The actual dollar amount, on a per capita basis at the state level, Calculations performed by Wilson in the forthcoming paper,
estimated to be received from the American Recovery and
“Fiscal Spending Job Multipliers,” in Table 2 of the document.
Reinvestment Act.

Appendix C: Control Variables
Variable name

Definition

Source/Calculation

LAWAGET0_R

Average household wage of wage-earning households at
time t=0, logged. In 2010 constant dollars.

U.S. Census Bureau. 1990 and 2000 Decennial Census.
2010 one-year American Community Survey. Figure was
adjusted for inflation (2010 constant dollars) and logged.

LTXPEREMP4_R

Average of annual total taxes received, per employee, at
time T=0, T+1, T+2, and T+3, logged. In 2010 constant
dollars.

U.S. Census Bureau. Census of State and Local
Government, editions 1990–1993 and 2000–2003. Measure
calculated by summing four year total tax receipts and
dividing by employment at time t=0, then dividing the
resulting figure by four to calculated annual average.
Resulting figures adjusted for inflation, then logged.

LPOPDENS0

Persons per square mile at time t=0

U.S. Census Bureau. 1990 and 2000 Decennial Census.
Measure calculated by dividing total population at time t=0
by land area in square miles.
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